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ABSTRACT 
This study evaluates the effectiveness of security education, training, and awareness (SETA) 
programs though the examination of the knowledge expiration process. The prevalence of security 
threats has led companies to invest more in information security. However, it is questionable how 
much a single training session could contribute to information security. We examine the knowledge 
types in a typical training program and measure the "shelf lives" of the knowledge. We find that 
technical knowledge decays faster than application knowledge, and both types of knowledge 
evaporate within a month following the training. This paper will contribute to the information 
security literature by revealing the ineffectiveness of single training sessions in the long run and 
suggest remedies to ensure consistent security policy compliance. 
Keywords: cyber attack, security, awareness, knowledge, training, forgetting curve 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Information security is a pressing issue for 
businesses. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Co-Directors of 
Enforcement Stephanie A vakian and Steven 
Peikin warned, "The greatest threat to our 
markets right now is the cyber threat." With 
virtually every company turning digital, at least 
57 per cent of them had a recent significant 
cybersecurity incident [l]. Even tech giants are 
not immune to security breaches. In April 2017, 
Google and Facebook fell for a phishing attack, 
where unsuspected employees wired a total $100 
million to a scammer that posed as a business 
partner [2]. 
This is merely one example where having a 
strong IT infrastructure is not enough to 
prevent cyberattacks in today's environment. 
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Oftentimes, humans are the weakest link. 
Studies have shown that employees from within 
the organizations are the leading threats to IS 
security [3 , 4], and non-malicious insiders such 
as careless or unaware employees are the major 
security vulnerability [1, 3]. 
Therefore, it is of utmost importance to 
build a "human firewall" through training 
programs [5]. Employees should learn early on 
the dos and don'ts in the digital world. For 
example, never click on suspicious links in their 
emails. However, sceptics of security trainings 
might question the usefulness of such training 
programs. After all, some employees are only 
trained through a quick slide show when they 
entered the company. We argue that the 
ineffectiveness of training is because the training 
is not carried out properly. 
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We first conduct a controlled experiment to 
show that training is, in fact, effective in 
reducing phishing succumbence rate. Next , we 
examine the knowledge expiration process after 
security trainings. We posit that the long-term 
ineffectiveness of training is partly due to the 
short "shelf lives" of training knowledge. If 
training knowledge decays quickly, employees 
are effectively untrained after a period of time. 
There are few empirical studies on t he 
effectiveness of the training [5]. In view of this 
deficiency, we utilize theories from learning and 
forgetting to understand the training 
effectiveness in the long run. In doing so, we will 
empirically determine the "expiration date" of 
current training programs. 
In measuring the training outcomes, we will 
focus on actual compliance behaviors. The 
fundamental role of awareness in information 
security is long established [6 , 7, 8], but there is 
a lack of empirical evidence to demonstrate that 
increased awareness level would affect 
compliance behavior. Intention to comply is 
often measured in lieu of actual compliance. An 
empirical evaluation of the training outcomes 
would potentially fill this gap. 
From a practical standpoint, an assessment 
of SET A programs will enable more effective 
training designs, and potentially prevent the 
severe financial losses due to security breaches 
[9 , 10]. It is estimated that cyberattacks cost 
businesses $400 billion a year [ 11]. The world 
could lose $90 trillion by 2030 if cybersecurity 
measures fall short [12]. In some industries, data 
breaches will also incur government fines on top 
of financial losses. In 2016, a hospital was fined 
$5.5 million [13] for compromising patient 
information, which violated the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIP AA). 
Furthermore, improved training programs 
will provide guidelines for companies to spend 
their ever-increasing cybersecurity investments 
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more effectively. In 2015, Bank of America, Citi 
Bank, J.P. Morgan, and Wells Fargo spent a 
total of $1.5 billion on cybersecurity [14] . The 
cumulative 2015-2020 cybersecurity market size 
for US financial industries alone is forecasted to 
exceed $77 billion, making it the largest non-
government cybersecurity market [15]. 
While industries are spending more on 
cybersecurity in general [1 , 10, 16], it is not clear 
how much investment went into SET A 
programs, considering that 47 percent of the 
organizations still did not have any security 
training program as of 2016 [16] . Companies 
would be more willing to invest in SET A 
programs if we could show the improved 
security as a result of such programs. 
Unfortunately, simply having a program 
may not be enough. Learning effects tend to 
decay overtime as modeled by the forgetting 
curve [17] . For the 53 percent of the 
organizations that do conduct security trainings 
[16], the training may range from voluntary 
review of a short slide show to more extensive 
online and face-to-face trainings covering a wide 
range of topics with a test at the end. There is 
little public information on the form and lasting 
effect of these programs. In light of the 
theoretical and practical gaps, we investigate 
the effectiveness of existing SETA programs, 
and propose measures to prolong the positive 
effects of training. The research questions are as 
follows. (1) Does SETA program help prevent 
security breaches? (2) How long does the 
learning effect last? (3) What are the measures 
to prolong the learning effect? 
The rest of the article is organized as 
follows. §2 discusses the learning effect of the 
SETA programs. §3 studies knowledge decay. §4 
discusses potential retraining mechanisms to 
ensure a consistent high level of security policy 
compliance rate. Since our experiments are 
conducted in the context of phishing, we will 
review literature on phishing §5. §6 will layout 
the two pilot studies. §7 concludes with 
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limitations and future research plans. This 
paper will contribute to the information security 
literature by revealing the ineffectiveness of 
single training sessions in the long run and 
suggest remedies to ensure consistent security 
policy compliance. 
2. LEARNING 
Information systems security management is a 
knowledge-intensive activity [18]. Employees 
usually acquire basic information security 
knowledge through SET A programs. Learning 
theory suggests that trainings (learning-before-
doing) are effective in increasing trainees' 
knowledge level [19]. In this study, we will not 
go into details of the learning process in 
training. However, due to the reciprocity of 
learning and forgetting, we briefly review the 
literature on learning. 
A large body of literature on learning 
focused on workers' learning behavior in 
manufacturing environment [e.g. , 20, 21 , 22]. 
The learning curve was applied in other areas 
such as education [23], economics [24], and 
management [25]. Notably, Kim et al. [26] 
applied the learning curve towards IT support 
services. To our knowledge, there is no theory 
of learning in the context of SET A programs. 
As demonstrated in Kim et al. [26] , learning 
can occur even in the volatile environment of IT 
support services. In IS security, there are also 
rapid evolution of different security threats. 
While the traditional Nigeria prince phishing 
emails may still trick some people, new tricks 
are constantly emerging. Some spear phishing 
emails are now sent from hacked email accounts 
familiar to the recipients, making it more 
difficult to identify the security threats. 
However, unlike IT support services, where 
employees were learning-by-doing, the learning-
before-doing SET A programs have a relative 
stable format. This raises question whether a 
preset SET A program is sufficient in coping 
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with the changing IS security environment. We 
will discuss more of that in retraining in §4. 
SET A programs generally involve more than 
one type of knowledge. For instance, part of the 
program may teach employees what a VPN is 
and why it is important, while another part of 
the program may teach them how to install 
relevant software on their computer and mobile 
devices. It is of value to assess any differential 
effect of different types of knowledge, so that 
organizations can adjust their programs 
accordingly based on their goals. 
Knowledge was traditionally classified into 
two categories, content knowledge and 
knowledge regarding learning how to learn [27]. 
For IS studies, Kim et al. [26] divided IT 
knowledge into two subsets: (1) application-
level knowledge that everybody possesses to use 
IT for practical purposes and ( 2) technical-level 
knowledge that goes beyond the simple usage of 
IT. We are interested to know which of the two 
types of knowledge would last longer following 
a SET A program. 
As Dutton and Thomas pointed out, the 
learning rate should not be treated as a constant 
[28]. Learning curves may depend on an 
individual's task proficiency [29]. For now, we 
will focus on the fact that training will increase 
trainees' security knowledge. 
Hypothesis 1: After a SET A program, 
trainees' information security knowledge will 
increase compared to the pre-training level. 
Admittedly, there is an obvious gap between 
gaining knowledge and applying the knowledge 
to prevent security breach in the work 
environment. We attempt to address the issue 
through a controlled experiment to show that 
SETA program is effective in reducing phishing 
succumbence rate; however, even as knowledge 
level increases following training, and such 
increase help prevent security breaches, it is not 
clear how long the positive effect is going to last . 
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3. FORGETTING 
With the learning effect of SET A programs in 
mind, the next step is to investigate how long 
these effects could last. We suspect that 
employees are prone to quickly forget security 
knowledge they obtained during one single 
training session. If any positive learning effect 
quickly wears off, employees are essentially 
untrained after the learning effects "expire." 
Hence, decay in knowledge will likely negatively 
affect security policy compliance over the long 
run. 
Before attempting to devise any counter-
measures to the potential knowledge decay, we 
need to have to a full understanding of the 
knowledge decay process. In particular, we will 
empirically determine the "expiration date" of 
training programs, and whether different 
knowledge types have different decay trajectory. 
The natural means to model the forgetting 
process is through forgetting curves. Forgetting 
curve was first proposed by the well-known 
psychologist Hermann Ebbinghaus in 1885 [30]. 
Ebbinghaus memorized a series of nonsense 
syllables and tested his memory at various 
periods ranging from 20 minutes to 31 days. 
This simple experiment showed an exponential 
decay in memory. 
The simplest form of forgetting curves is a 
decreasing linear function , where the dependent 
variable is the level of memory retention, and 
the independent variable is the time. Linear 
functions are best used to model drop in short 
intervals of time, but not for longer intervals. 
There are four basic forms of forgetting curve 
for longer periods, power function , hyperbola 
function, exponential function, and logarithmic 
function. Other variations of function are 
mostly based on these basic forms , which are all 
decreasing and convex. In other words, the 
initial decline is sharper than the latter decline. 
Page 200 
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Hypothesis 2: Following a SETA program, 
trainees' information security knowledge will 
decrease over a period of time. 
Similar to learning curves, forgetting curves 
have been applied in different disciplines such 
as education [31], economics [22], and 
management [32]. However , application of 
forgetting curves in Information Systems (IS) 
has been limited. In one of the few instances ) 
i.e., software development , the knowledge of 
methodology was found to be more easily 
forgotten than the knowledge of domain or 
technology [33]. 
Notably, learning process does not 
determine the forgetting curve. Forgetting rate 
is shown to be independent from learning rate 
[34]. Forgetting rate is determined by several 
factors such as the original level of learning [35], 
and type of the task. Procedural tasks [36] and 
cognitive tasks [37] are more prone to forgetting , 
while forgetting in continuous controls, such as 
bicycle riding, are negligible [38]. We are more 
interested to see whether the different 
knowledge types have different forgetting rates. 
Since ordinary employees are not tech-savvy, 
and everyday use of technology do not require 
deep knowledge, we posit that technical 
knowledge will decrease faster than application 
knowledge. 
Hypothesis 3: After a SETA program, 
trainees' technical-level knowledge will decrease 
faster than application-level knowledge. 
It is tempting to simply assume SET A 
programs should consist of a larger proportion 
of the type of knowledge that is more effective, 
but in evaluating training effectiveness in the 
long run, we should also take into account the 
forgetting rate. For instance, one type of 
knowledge may be effective in the short run but 
easily forgotten, while another type may be less 
effective in the short run but has a lower 
forgetting rate. Therefore, decision on the 
proportion of the two types of knowledge in a 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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SET A program will likely involve some 
intricacy. 
In understanding the forgetting process, 
estimating the average forgetting rate is 
practically difficult. One could only measure a 
subject's knowledge level a few times at most in 
an experimental setting. As an alternative, we 
will quantify in our second pilot study how long 
it takes before security knowledge drop to the 
pre-training level, (i.e., the "expiration date" of 
the training program.) Shorter "expiration date" 
means faster knowledge decay, which is 
equivalent to a higher average forgetting rate. 
4. RETRAJNING 
Knowledge decay call for measures to prolong 
the positive effects of training. One natural 
response is retraining. While it seems extremely 
costly to retrain employees every month, 
retraining need not be repeated indefinitely 
thanks to a reduction of the forgetting rate 
following each retraining [30, 39, 40]. In fact, the 
retraining time to achieve the peak performance 
level is likely to be less than half of the original 
training time [36] . 
It is suggested that repeatedly training 
employees will reinforce the learning effect and 
ultimately maintain the knowledge at a higher 
level [40 , 41]. Each retraining will alter the next 
forgetting curve, making it flatter (i.e. , lowering 
the average forgetting rate. ) Ultimately, the 
forgetting curve would be so flat, that the 
forgetting rate is close to zero. Hence, loss of 
knowledge can eventually be neglected. 
In designing retraining programs, one needs 
to consider the moderating roles on repetitive 
training. In advertising, ease of message 
processing was identified as a moderator for the 
repetition effect [42]. In the context of SETA 
program, training format may be one 
moderator. 
It is noteworthy that repetitive training is 
not equivalent to massed repetition. The 
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spacing effect suggests learning is more effective 
when studying is spread out over time [43]. 
Advertising literature has pointed out the 
ineffectiveness of repeating the same 
advertisement in a short interval [44]. To avoid 
cramming m recurring SET A sessions, 
retraining may be alternated based on different 
contents. 
As mentioned in §2, the volatile IT 
environment also motivates repeated training. A 
change in the content of training is somewhat 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is 
conceivable that retraining planned around a 
short "shelf life" is unlikely to involve much 
additional new material. If new materials are 
required, alternating the new and old material 
in recurring training might effectively boost the 
spacing effect. 
In short, retraining is an effective measure 
to mitigate the short "shelf lives" of training 
knowledge. It is noteworthy that retraining need 
not be carried out indefinitely. After a few 
retraining sessions, training knowledge will be 
maintained at a relatively high level. 
5. PHISIDNG 
As mentioned in §2, some may question whether 
increase in knowledge can be reflected in the 
reduction of security breaches. To address the 
issue, we will test the effectiveness of a SET A 
in terms of phishing prevention. We will briefly 
review the literature on phishing. 
Phishing is among the top threats in 
cybersecurity [l]. As pointed out in the 
introduction, even tech giants with relatively 
advanced security mechanisms can become 
victims of phishing attacks. 
As a result, more companies start to lay 
emphases on phishing in SET A programs. 
According to the latest Ernst & Young 
cybersecurity survey, 79 per cent of the 
surveyed organizations perform self-phishing 
within the company [l]. Due to the nature of 
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social engineering, phishing attacks can often be 
avoided by teaching employees the basic 
knowledge of identifying "red flags" in emails 
and reminding them to be constantly vigilant 
for such cues. In simulating real attacks, 
companies are able to test the knowledge of the 
employees, and the effectiveness of their 
training. 
Phishing is studied extensively in prior 
literature. Wright et al. (2014) addressed the 
differential effects of different influencing 
techniques in phishing based on persuasion and 
motivation theory [45]. They found that 
individuals were more vulnerable to techniques 
offering a high level of self-determination. 
Interestingly, they also found males were 
significantly less likely to respond to phishing 
emails than females. However, other studies 
found no significant difference between genders 
[46]. Also, individuals aged between 18 and 25 
are most susceptible to phishing attacks [46]. 
In terms of anti-phishing training methods, 
Kumaraguru et al. (2007) found that users learn 
more effectively when the training materials are 
presented after users fall for the attack, and 
users retain and transfer more knowledge in 
such training [47]. This may well explain why 
almost 80 per cent of the companies are 
performing self-phishing [ l]. 
In a more specific study, Kumaraguru et al. 
( 2009) focused on a specific kind of training 
module called PhishGuru, where users were 
trained right after clicking on the link in an 
artificial phishing email. It was revealed that 
such training allows users retain knowledge 
longer than usual, and repetitive trainings are 
effective in preventing phishing attacks [48]. 
For our purpose, we will focus on a generic 
phishing attempt to show that phishing 
succumbence rate falls as a result of training. 
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6. PILOT STUDIES 
We conducted two pilot studies. The first pilot 
study measured the effectiveness of training in 
preventing phishing attacks . Pilot study 2 
measured the decay of training knowledge over 
a period of time. Together, the two pilot studies 
demonstrate the short-term effectiveness and 
long-term ineffectiveness of training. 
6 .1 Pilot Study 1 
In an attempt to learn if training programs can 
help mitigate phishing attacks on employees 
(i.e. , everyday computer users), we conducted a 
pilot study. The study took place in a large 
university in the midwestern United States. 
Three groups of students ( n> 100 each) were 
evaluated for the ability to identify and not 
react to phishing attacks. 
We believe college students are appropriate 
respondents for this study, because like 
everyone else, they face consequences if they 
succumb to an attack. A freshman college 
student is rather similar to a new employee in 
the security training context . They are both new 
to the organization, which is usually when 
security trainings take place. Also, their 
priorities are not IS security. Students tend to 
worry more about their coursework, and 
employees mainly focus on their job 
performance. Like companies, universities also 
experience data breaches from time to time. 
College students, being the majority population 
on campus, need to receive proper security 
awareness training. 
All three groups of students received a pre-
test on their ability to identify phishing emails. 
The first group was a control group with no 
follow-up trainings. After the pre-test, the 
second group was given a short ( 5 minute) 
recurring training sessions once a week for the 
next six weeks. The third groups received the 
same type of recurring training twice a week for 
six weeks. 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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In the training, the respondents reviewed 
various emails and determined whether they 
were phishing attacks. Afterward, their 
instructor went over the emails with the 
students and explained what made them 
phishing attacks or not. 
After all training sessions were finished, the 
researcher waited a week before sending an 
artificial phishing email to all respondents in the 
study. The prevailing thought is that more 
training will better prepare the respondents to 
identify and not succumb to phishing attacks. 
The results show 20% of people in the 
control group succumbed to phishing attacks. 
The number dropped to 10% for treatment 
groups, suggesting the positive effective of the 
phishing training. However, there is no 
significant difference between the two treatment 
groups, which was somewhat surprising. 
We believe the unexpected results could 
have occurred for a number of reasons. First , the 
respondents were given their phishing attack 
either the week before finals exams or the week 
of finals exams. This is a very high-stress, high-
tempo time period at a university, and the 
students may have been overwhelmed by all the 
end-of-term email traffic and failed to correctly 
identify the bogus email. Second, the phishing 
email may have been too authentic looking. The 
email appeared to be from the university 
bursar's office informing the students that a 
two-thousand-dollar payment is due in their 
bursar account and requested that they click on 
the link and follow the instructions. It is possible 
that students were very worried about the 
accounts and responded to the attack. The 
researcher who developed the email was very 
familiar with the university bursar emails and 
developed a very authentic looking email. 
Typical phishing emails are developed by those 
outside the organization and the perpetrator has 
very little information about the organization, 
its processes, and other internal indicators. 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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While not perfect , this pilot study proved to 
be informative. We have shown a positive 
training effect in preventing phishing attacks. 
To understand the mechanisms behind an 
effective training program, we intend to conduct 
similar training in a future study, and conduct 
follow-up interviews to ask students why they 
avoided or failed to identify the phishing attack. 
6. 2 Pilot Study 2 
Pilot study 2 was designed to estimate the 
"expiration date" of a typical training program 
that involves both application and technical 
knowledge. Similar to pilot study 1, the sample 
was drawn from three different sections of an 
introductory information system management 
course in a large mid-western university in the 
United States. Each section had approximately 
150 students. 
IS security knowledge levels were measured 
by SET A quiz results. Each quiz had a total of 
twenty questions, half of which tested technical 
knowledge, the other half tested application 
knowledge. A week before the training, 
participants took an in-class quiz (pre-test) on 
security topics to set the baseline of 
participants' security knowledge. A week after 
the pretest, an in-class training module was 
presented by the course instructor. Immediately 
after the training, participants took another in 
class quiz (post-test 1). The pretest and posttest 
1 used the same quiz. 
Depending on which of the three class 
sections the students were in, participants then 
took a third in-class quiz (post-test 2) 15, 30 or 
45 days after post-test 1. Since the study is 
largely exploratory, the choice of the intervals 
was based on authors' experience. Post-test 2 
used slightly different questions, but all quizzes 
are on the same topic, and at the same level of 
difficulty. We avoided too many repeated tests 
on one group to minimize the distortion of 
learning effect in retesting. The three test scores 
are paired by student ID. 
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Summary statistics show a sharp increase in 
test scores from pre-test to post-test 1 and a 
sharp decrease from post-test 1 to post-test 2 
(figure 1). ANOVA on pre-test results of all 
three groups suggests equal group means 
Knowledge Expiration in Security ... 
(p= 0.6966). Within each group, repeated 
measures ANOVA on the three test results show 
that at least two of them are not equal 
(p< 0.001). Pairwise t-tests will determine which 
two (three) are not equal. 
Pre-te Post•test 1 PO$t-- s-t. 2 
Gra1.1p 1 
t11- -7 t1 = II 
Pre-test Po.st-te-.st 1 Post-test 2 
Gro Pl: I 
---------------------' t,o ""' - 7 f1 = ti 
Pre-test P-ost-t t l l'Ost•te:s.t 2 Group~ 1, ... 1 __________________________ __,! 
to = - 7 t 1 = 0 i ·2 = 45 
Figure 1. Pilot Study 2 Design 
Table 1 
Overall T est Score Chanqe 
Pre-test Post-test 1 Post-test 2 
Group 1 12.55 14.71 12.85 
Group 2 12.50 14.11 12.78 
Group 3 12.48 14.51 12.95 
P -t P•OSNe-St 1 
Gro1.1pl 
t0 = -7 t 1 = 0 
Pre-test Po5t·t ,st 1 Post-test 2 
t,o • - 7 f1 = ti 
Pre-test Post-t • t l Group~ I,._ __ _._ _______________________ ___. 
t() = -7 f1 = 0 
Figure 1. Pilot Study 2 Design 
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Figure 2. Overall Test Score Change 
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Figure 3. Technical Knowledge Score Change 
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Pre-test Post-test 1 Post-test2 
- Group 1 - Group 2 - Group 3 
Figure 4. Application Knowledge Score Change 
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Table 2. 
Paired t-test for Pre-test and Post-test 2 
-value 
Overall Technical Application 
Group 1 122 0.0849 0.3881 0.0383 
Group 2 112 0.1579 0.4805 0.1101 
Group 3 74 0.0026 0.4044 0.0001 
stand for the test score at the pre- or post- tests 1 or 2. 
Pairwise comparison by paired t-test showed 
a significant increase in overall test scores from 
pre-test to post-test 1 in all three groups 
(p< 0.001), thus confirming the positive learning 
effect. Also, paired t-test showed a significant 
decrease in test scores from post-test 1 to post-
test 2 (p< 0.001) confirming the knowledge 
decay as predicted by forgetting curves. The 
results also hold for technical and application 
knowledge (figure 3, 4). 
A similar pattern can be observed for 
participants scoring 80% or higher right after 
the training (post-test 1), which means any 
positive learning effect soon wears off. While 
government regulations such as HIP AA require 
employees in certain industries to be trained and 
reach a certain threshold, the knowledge decay 
pattern shown here suggest such seemingly 
demanding regulations may lose effect before 
long. 
In order to devise meaningful retraining 
programs, we need to quantify the "expiration 
date" of each type of knowledge. To do that, we 
compare pre-test and post-test 2 scores ( table 2) 
to see how long it took for the training effect to 
wear off. Intuitively, "expiration date" for a 
training program is when the post-test 2 scores 
equal the pre-test scores. 
For technical knowledge, the post-test 2 
score is statistically the same as the pre-test 
Page 206 
score for all three groups ( table 2). Since the 
forgetting curve is a decreasing function, this 
means the learning effect of technical knowledge 
most likely wore off within 15 days following the 
training program. 
For application knowledge, result for group 
1 shows that post-test 2 score is still 
significantly higher than the pre-test score at 
0.05 level (table 2), meaning there is still room 
for further decline. For group 2, post-test 2 score 
is statistically the same as the pre-test score. 
However, we cannot abruptly conclude that 
training expired at 30 days. It could happen 
some point before that. We conclude that the 
"shelf life" for application knowledge is 
somewhere between 15 and 30 days. 
The abnormal results for group 3 are 
possibly due to the dramatic shrink in sample 
size. We believe those remained in class towards 
the end of the semester were probably more 
motivated students, who took the training more 
seriously in the first place. Hence, the group 3 
sample at post-test 2 is biased. Although there 
is significant decrease from post-test 1 to post-
test 2, the decay was not large enough to reduce 
them to their original knowledge level. 
We found different "expiration dates" for 
different types of knowledge. Technical 
knowledge seems extremely short-lived (less 
than 15 days) , while application knowledge has 
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a relative longer life (between 15 to 30 days). It 
is safe to conclude any positive learning effect of 
a SETA program evaporates within a month. 
7. CONCLUSION, 
LIMITATION AND 
FUTURE STUDIES 
Pilot study 1 has shown the positive effect of 
training in preventing phishing attacks. The 
"casualty rate" fell from 20% to 10% after the 
training. As a follow-up , we plan to conduct 
interviews on why students succumbed or 
avoided phishing traps. Furthermore, we have 
planned another study to determine what types 
of training would be more effective in preventing 
phishing attacks. We expect to see a differential 
learning effect on technical and application 
knowledge as discussed in §2. 
Pilot study 2 has quantified the "shelf life" 
of technical and application knowledge. We 
have shown while both types are short-lived, 
technical knowledge decays faster than 
application knowledge. The short "shelf-life" 
should prompt the need for retraining. 
We intend to conduct recurring training 
experiments to test the stabilization of 
knowledge. The ongoing studies on learning and 
forgetting need to be completed first to pinpoint 
the expiration point of the two types of 
knowledge and quantify the potential 
differential effectiveness. Based on those data, 
we would be able to decide the optimal 
knowledge composition of the training programs 
as well as retraining windows. Finally, we will 
test the effectiveness of the re-designed SET A 
program. 
The two pilot studies have a few limitations. 
First, more control variables may need to be 
added in pilot study 1 in order to explain the 
lack of difference between the two treatment 
groups. Second, the in-class training in pilot 
study 2 has time limits as opposed to online 
trainings. It is possible a more thorough self-
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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learning could postpone the expiry of the 
training. However, employees' willingness to 
engage in self-training is questionable given that 
IS security is not their main obligation. Third, 
there was a significant reduction in sample size 
for the third group in pilot study 2. These 
shortcomings will be addressed in the follow-up 
primary studies. 
The pilot studies were meant to be 
exploratory. Future main studies will be refined 
to fully address the research questions raised in 
§1. This paper will add to security policy 
compliance literature showing that a full 
understanding of the knowledge expiration 
processes could improve the design of SET A 
programs, and ultimately enhance IS security 
policy compliance behavior. 
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